4 that would at least partly directly flow into the EU budget.
11 Against this backdrop, it seems already less drastic to propose simply a harmonization of the national tax bases. In view of the dramatic economic developments in Greece and other EU Member States, critics could more willingly accept harmonization in the field of economic and fiscal policy. At the same time, the currency union is imperiled now more than ever. Due to erosion processes, also measures to create common tax bases could be put off to a time in the distant future.
For all these reasons, it is extremely uncertain at this point whether, when and in which form the forwarded CCCTB proposal will be part of Union law. The fact that a specific proposal for a Directive has been available since 2011 has further boosted the discussions. The scientific analysis involves not only mere considerations in respect of the concept of such a common consolidated corporate tax base, but also concrete proposals for the rules as such. It will be up to scholars to review that proposal critically and to point to doubts and weaknesses, if any, to pave the ground for an advancement of the proposal. If the competent EU bodies should decide to make the CCCTB concept reality, whatever its form may be, they should be able to rely on those considerations. This paper will focus on some provisions of the proposal, which are relevant for companies which are tax resident outside the EU or for commercial activities carried out there, and for EU resident companies that operate in third countries. I will primarily discuss the territoriality principle, on which the CCCTB concept is based, and its legal technical structure. However, I
will not discuss other provisions of the proposal, even if those should specifically address third country scenarios, such as those concerning deductibility of donations 12 , the transfer of assets 13 or deductibility of interest 14 .
II. Achievement of the territoriality principle
Comprehensive taxation of resident companies
At least at first sight, the provisions of the CCCTB proposal distinguish between worldwide taxation and purely territorial taxation: Pursuant to Art 6 (6) of the proposal "a company 11 European Commission of 28 September 2011, proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC , COM(2011) 594. 12 Art 12 in conjunction with Art 16. 13 Art 31. 14 Art 81.
5 resident in a Member State which opts for the system provided for by this Directive shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income derived from any source, whether inside or outside its Member State of residence". Art 6 (7) of the proposal on the other hand provides that "a company resident in a third country which opts for the system provided for by this Directive shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income from an activity carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State".
The Directive shall hence be applicable to companies resident both inside and outside the EU.
Art 2 of the proposal distinguishes between "companies established under the laws of a
Member State" (paragraph 1) and "companies established under the laws of a third country" (paragraph 2). The first group is subject to a "list system" primarily known from other fiscal Directives. 15 A company established under the laws of a Member State is subject to the Directive if it takes one of the forms listed in Annex I and is subject to one of the corporate taxes listed in Annex II or to a similar tax subsequently introduced. However, Annex II treats the companies rather differently. The list of legal forms is exhaustive for some states. In other cases, there is a general clause, for example for "other companies constituted under French law subject to the French Corporate Tax". 16 While the list of companies, albeit different for each Member State, eventually seems to be exhaustive, there is a general clause for corporate taxes, which provides that not only the corporate taxes listed in Annex II, but also similar taxes subsequently introduced are eligible. Such a comparability test is known from Art 2 (4) OECD-MC 17 or Art 3 (a) (iii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive. 18 While the provisions of the OECD-MC and those of the Interest and Royalties Directive are largely consistent, the authors of the CCCTB proposal have used an entirely different language in Art 2 (1) (b). This is an unsuitable approach, because the objective of those regulations seems to be the same in all these cases. A different language will lead to the risk of legal practice inferring a divergent content. In addition, Art 2 (3) of the proposal provides that the Commission may adopt delegated acts
"in order to amend Annexes I and II to take account of changes to the laws of the Member
States concerning company forms and corporate taxes". Pursuant to Art 127 (1) of the proposal, that power to adopt delegated acts shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time. Pursuant to Art 128 (1), the delegation of powers may be revoked at any time by the Council. Furthermore, pursuant to Art 129 (1), the Council may object to a delegated act within a period of three months from the date of notification. If, on the expiry of this period, the Council has not objected to the delegated act, it shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and shall enter into force on the date stated therein pursuant to Art 129 (2). The delegated act may be published in the Official
Journal of the European Union if the Council has informed the Commission of its intention
not to raise objections. Accordingly, the list of corporate forms referred to in Annex I may be extended by way of comitology. 19 In case of "a similar tax subsequently introduced", however, the adjustment must be made by the Member State itself or, in case of a lack or erroneous transposition by the Member State, the common tax base may be applied in direct reliance on the Directive. Other than the introduction of newly created corporate forms, the introduction of new taxes does not require a comitology procedure to ensure that these are covered by the Directive., obviously because Annex I contains a general clause anyway for those Member States that consider an automatic adjustment appropriate in case of new corporate forms. A similar provision can be found in Art 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and in Art 3 of the Interest and Royalties Directive. These Directives even provide for a similarly differentiated list system for the corporate forms. That system is not subject to change by way of comitology, while a comparability test is sufficient in case of corporate taxes within the framework of the CCCTB.
Art 2 (1) of the CCCTB proposal -just like Art 2 (2) -merely requires that the company "is subject to" one of the corporate taxes, while Art 2 (1) (c) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Art 3 (1) (iii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive requires that the company be subject to tax "without being exempt". This implies that the company may be subject to the CCCTB rules even if it is exempt. 20 Accordingly, we would have to distinguish between companies exempt from national corporate tax to which the Directive may be applied, and those 7 companies that are not subject to national corporate tax in the first place and can thus not be subject to the scope of application of the Directive. There is little point in terms of legal policy to make that distinction, as that approach would make the coincidental national legislative techniques relevant for purposes of Union law. 21 However, these differences in language must not be over-emphasized anyway, since also the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on the one hand and the Interest and Royalties Directive on the other hand are different, without that fact being material. While Art 2 ( 1) (c) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive emphasizes that the company must be subject to one of the taxes stated therein "without the possibility of an option", that reference cannot be found in the Interest and Royalties Directive. Still, it would be desirable if the authors of the CCCTB proposal followed the wording of provisions of an already existing Directive in order to avoid additional problems of interpretation which can arise from these very differences.
Art 6 of the CCCTB proposal substantially distinguishes between companies which are resident for tax purposes in a Member State (paragraph 1) and companies which are not resident for tax purposes in a Member State (paragraph 2). The first group is entirely subject to the Directive if it opts for the system. When opting for the system, the second group can be subject to the provisions of the Directive only in respect of its permanent establishments located in the EU. Pursuant to Art 6 (3) of the proposal, a company that has its registered office, place of incorporation or place of effective management in a Member State shall be considered resident for tax purposes in that Member State. Contrary to Art 2 (a)(ii) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Art 3 (a) (ii) of the Interest and Royalties Directive, the residence criteria must autonomously be derived from Union law 22 , without any reference to national law. The language of Art 6 (3) of the CCCTB proposal in turn rather reminds us of Art 4 (1) OECD-MC, although it is not fully identical with it: Art 4 (1) OECD-MC does not specifically mention the registered office and merely refers to the place of "management" and not to "effective management". The terms "effective management" however can be found in the so-called tie-breaker rule of Art 4 (3) OECD-MC. Rather than being similar to Art 4 (1)
OECD-MC, Art 6 (7) of the CCCTB proposal is similar to Art 4 (1) UN-MC and to Art 4 (1) However, in other cases, income from third countries may be subject to tax, for example if it
is not "income of a permanent establishment". If a taxpayer engages in commercial activities in a third country without establishing a fixed place of business, he will therefore still be taxed on his worldwide income. Furthermore, the principle of attraction does not apply either.
Consequently, not the mere existence of a permanent establishment in another state will lead to an exemption of all income generated in this state. As the proposal only exempts "income of a permanent establishment" the income has to be attributable to the permanent There is no apparent reason for this derogation from Art 5 OECD-MC. Not only does this addition seem superfluous, it also raises doubts as will be shown below. 
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The proposal does not contain any provision which specifically refers to the allocation of profits. Since numerous provisions are parallel to those of the OECD-Model-such as those regarding permanent establishments -obviously, the principles relevant in connection with The exemption of "received profit distributions" does not define the legal nature of the participation which establishes the right to receive profit distributions. It is therefore uncertain whether corporate law is relevant here or whether a mere obligation is sufficient, provided a corresponding share is held in equity. Similarly, the specific requirements which an entity has to fulfill to qualify as a source of "distributions of profits" are not defined.
Some indications for a definition of "distributions of profits" could be found in Art 82 (1) (a) of the proposal: The provisions for "controlled foreign companies" are supposed to subject to direct taxation income received by the foreign entity at the level of the shareholder or persons with a similarly controlling position. These provisions shall apply if the taxpayer by itself, or together with its associated enterprises, holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 50% of the voting rights, or owns more than 50% of the capital or is entitled to receive more than 50% of the profits of that entity. Supposedly, taxpayers could also receive distributions of profits if they either have voting rights or hold capital or are entitled to profits. However, pursuant to Art 83 (2) of the proposal, the income to be included in the tax base "shall be calculated in proportion to the entitlement of the taxpayer to share in the profits of the foreign entity". This, in turn, implies that only an entity that is entitled to the profits can have a "received profit distribution".
Another approach could be based on the definition of dividends. Although the CCCTB proposal does not contain such a definition, its Art 81 (2) specifies interest in conformity with Art 11 (3) OECD-MC, which has also been adopted in the Interest and Royalties Directive. Directive, which merely necessitates the exemption of profit distributions. This is a consistent systematic approach, since a shareholder frequently faces the option of realizing the profits generated by his entity either in the form of profit distributions or in the form of capital gains.
For all these cases, Art 72 provides that for determining the tax rate applicable to a taxpayer, without prejudice to Article 75, revenue which is exempt from taxation pursuant to Art 11 (c), that revenue is a gross figure, the expenses attributable to third-country income could not be taken into account. This would hardly make sense in terms of legal policy, as this would not lead to an exemption of foreign income in cases of high related expenses.
Taxation of EU permanent establishments and third-country residents
Companies resident in third countries may also be subject to the CCCTB in respect of their EU-based permanent establishments. In determining the tax base, the profits attributable to the permanent establishment will be included. 33 The non-resident then forms a group together with that permanent establishment and the other qualified subsidiaries.
Pursuant to Art 2 of the proposal, the proposed Directive shall apply to a company established under the laws of a third country if it has a similar form to one of the forms listed in Annex I Interestingly enough, other than for companies established in the EU, no similarity test is necessary in respect of corporate tax; the company must rather be subject to one of the corporate taxes listed in Annex II. I presume that this is an editorial error, since it is hard to see why companies that are subject to a similar tax introduced later on in respect of their EU permanent establishments should not automatically be covered by the Directive in that case.
33 CCCTB Working Group, The territorial scope of the CCCTB, 9 March 2006, CCCTB/WP/026/, Section 30.
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In view of the non-discrimination of permanent establishments enshrined in existing DTCs with third countries, that discrimination could raise concerns.
Pursuant to Art 3 (1) of the proposal, the Commission shall adopt annually a list of third country company forms. That list shall meet the requirements laid down in Art 2 (2) (a) of the proposal and shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure provided therein.
In that case, a simplified authorization procedure applies: Pursuant to Art 5 of Regulation No 182/2011 34 , the committee shall deliver its opinion by the majority laid down in Art 16 (4) and (5) of the Treaty on European Union and, where applicable, Art 238 (3) TFEU, for acts to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. Where the committee delivers a positive opinion, the Commission shall adopt the draft implementing act.
However, the corporate forms are not listed exhaustively. Nevertheless, the fact that a company form is not included in the list of third country company forms referred to in paragraph 1 shall not preclude the application of this Directive to that form. This makes sense, because the Commission cannot always keep track of all changes in legislation worldwide. In this context, however, the question arises whether national legislators must implement that provision in a manner to allow administrative authorities and, eventually, the courts to carry out an examination procedure, or whether the national legislator itself is required to carry out an examination procedure and make continuous adjustments. Since the national legislator, just like the Commission, cannot always keep track of all changes in legislation worldwide, the national legislator might content itself with ordering an examination procedure by way of a general clause, which shall then be handled pursuant to the list prepared by the Commission according to Art 3 (2). The company forms referred to in that list must be regarded as similar in any case, although the fact that a company form is not included in the list does not preclude the application of this Directive to that form.
In view of the tax base, Art 6 (7) of the proposal combines territorial taxation with world-wide taxation of income: A company resident in a third country is subject to tax only on income from an activity carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State. This means that a permanent establishment must exist and that income must be attributable to the permanent establishment. On the other hand, income from that activity is taxable whether the activity concerns only the state of the permanent establishment or another EU Member State or even a third country: Consequently, if a US-resident company has a permanent establishment in the EU to which interest from the US is attributable, that permanent establishment is taxable under the CCCTB regime.
Pursuant to Art 6 (2) of the proposal, a company which is not resident for tax purposes in a Member State may opt for the system provided for by this Directive under the conditions laid down therein in respect of a permanent establishment maintained by it in a Member State.
Whether or not a permanent establishment exists again depends on the definition set forth in Art 5 of the proposal. As discussed above, that definition is largely modelled after the OECD Model Convention.
As a consequence, the question arises whether the numerous exemptions discussed above are applicable to non-resident companies as well. This would be the case under Union law only if the freedom of establishment applied. Besides situations involving EEA states, this could only refer to situations within the European Union. Arguably, the free movement of capital will not necessitate an extension of these exemptions to permanent establishments in relation to other third countries. However, this may be necessary since DTCs with third countries contain provisions which prohibit discrimination of permanent establishments.
The wording of the relevant exemptions as such is regularly not confined to resident companies. Art 11 of the proposal does not contain such a restriction at all: That provision generally exempts from corporate tax the proceeds mentioned therein without distinguishing as to whether these are earned by an EU resident or non-EU resident. Accordingly, the exemptions laid down in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) are applicable as well.
Consequently, if the dividends are attributed to the permanent establishment according to any of the principles discussed above, profit distributions are also exempt at the level of the permanent establishment. The same applies to proceeds from a disposal of shares which are part of the business assets of that permanent establishment. III. Derogation to the principle of territoriality
Taxation of interest and royalties
The CCCTB concept is characterized by the principle of territoriality. The authors of the proposal have initially assumed a comprehensive concept of income which is not confined to EU sources and have then restricted that taxation of worldwide income through the exemptions discussed above. As a consequence, however, any income is taxable which is subject to that concept and not exempt. Business profits generated outside the EU which are not attributable to a permanent establishment located outside the EU are therefore taxable pursuant to the CCCTB rules. 
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The same applies to other non-exempt income, in particular interest and royalties. The authors of the proposal have emphasized the taxable nature of that income by having incorporated in Art 76 a credit for foreign taxes. This provision requires income to be included in the tax base and being taxable in the EU.
The switch-over clause
Under certain circumstances, a switch-over from the exemption method to the credit method is possible in respect of the exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e). This witch-over is possible if the company which made the profit distributions, the entity the shares of which are disposed of or the permanent establishment were subject to tax at a rate which was too low in the country of residence of the company. 37 This fact will revive the tax liability, while the exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) are eliminated with the aim of avoiding double non-taxation or taxation under the general regime in a country.
The switch-over pursuant to Art 73 shall apply if "under the general regime in that third country" the entity which made the profit distributions, the entity the shares in which are disposed of or the permanent establishment were subject, in the entity's country of residence or the country in which the permanent establishment is situated is subject to "a tax on profits in the third country. A company may take advantage of a 20% special tax rate due to the fact that the permanent establishment is located in an area of the third country for which tax subsidies are granted. This "allows for a substantially lower level of taxation than the general regime". Art 73 (b) also requires this tax rate to be "substantially" lower than the general regime. There is no identifiable standard to measure substantiality. Let us assume that a tax rate which is 20% lower than the general regime qualifies as substantially lower rate. This example shows that a 20% special tax rate may trigger a switch-over, while a 15% regular tax rate will regularly not do so as long as the average applicable statutory corporate tax rate is lower than 15%.
Other than paragraph a, paragraph b of Art 73 does not refer to the "statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States", but only to the "level of taxation", apparently not referring to the nominal tax rate, but simply comparing the tax rate under the general regime with that which the special regime "allows for". Consequently, special provisions concerning the tax base should presumably fall under this provision. Let me give you an example: The corporate tax rate is generally 40% in the third country. Since the company's permanent establishment is located in an area of the third country for which tax subsidies are granted, the company may recognize special depreciation. Its profit therefore amounts to 500,000. Profits would have amounted to 1,000,000 without that special depreciation. The tax burden would have amounted to 400,000 at a 40% tax rate, but only 200,000 of tax are payable under the 21 special regime. The taxpayer reduced its tax burden to 20% in relation to the general regime.
The requirements for the application of Art 73 (b) are fulfilled 38 .
Some of these examples show that the provision can also apply in cases where there is no need for it in terms of legal policy. Particularly Art 73 (b) of the proposal leads to unjustified differentiation. If the tax rate under the general regime and the tax rate allowed for under a special regime do not amount to 40% and 20% respectively, but to 11% and 9%, the latter will presumably not be regarded as substantially lower as required under Art 73 (b). If the average rate of taxation relevant under Art 73 (a) is 10%, it will hence not trigger a switch-over, although the tax rate under the special regime is lower. Furthermore, a third country which disguises its benefits as general regimes and provides for a nominally higher tax rate can allow the resident companies or permanent establishments to escape the provision of Art 73.
These differentiations are undoubtedly dubious.
The legal uncertainty which this regime creates is however alarming: The applicable average corporate tax rate pursuant to Art 73 (a) of the proposal is easily determinable and will be notified by the Commission in advance. However, the proposal does not clearly define a standard based on which the "substantiality" Art 73 (b) calls for must be determined. The It can be just as difficult in a particular case to identify a "special regime". Which provisions qualify as "special regimes" will probably have to be determined in comparison with the "general regime". On the other hand, the CCCTB regime will have to be the standard.
Exemptions available in the third country for capital gains, profit distributions or profits generated by permanent establishments in other third countries will presumably not be special regimes.
Although Art 73 of the proposal is titled "Switch-over clause", the clause as such merely provides for an exception from the exemptions referred to in Art 11 (c), (d) and (e) and triggers a revival of the tax liability in respect of that income. This provision would make sense only if the permanent establishment's income were to be taken into account for the CCCTB tax base for purpose of the credit method and specifically the calculation of the maximum credit. However, neither Art 73 nor Art 74 of the proposal provides for an obligation to credit.
A credit obligation can however be derived from Art 76 of the proposal. If income has already been taxed in another Member State or in a third country, the foreign tax can be credited under that provision, except in respect of income that is exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c), (d) or (e). The text of these provisions hence does not mention as requirements the terms "interest"
and "royalties" which are mentioned in the title. The underlying objective is to credit foreign tax in order to eliminate double taxation in all cases in which it is not eliminated by way of exemption.
In the absence of other available provisions, Art 76 of the proposal can be relied upon as basis for the credit obligation connected with the switch-over. Its wording so permits, because it refers to "income which has been taxed […] in a third country" and exempts only "income
which is exempt under Article 11 (c), (d) or (e)". The exemption pursuant to Art 11 (c), (d)
and (e) does not apply, because it is precluded by Art 73.
It is questionable whether the scope of application of Art 76 is so broad to procure also an indirect credit of corporate tax imposed upon the third country entity in the cases in which 
Controlled foreign companies (CFCs)
A mere switch-over is not always the only option. In selected situations, the proposal also considers it acceptable to look through the entity resident outside the EU. Art 82 of the proposal contains such a CFC clause. 40 The tax base shall include the non-distributed income of an entity resident in a third country where certain conditions are met. The Commission has opted for such a rule although certainly not all Member States have adopted CFC rules in their national tax systems. 41 It has preferably adopted a provision which allows a look-through approach only if certain rather strict conditions are met. In any event, it specifically exempts companies, whose principal class of shares is regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges. Furthermore, pursuant to Art 82 (2) of the proposal, companies resident in an EEA state with which there is an agreement on the exchange of information under international law are exempt as well.
The rule is applicable to entities "resident in a third country". There is no separate definition of what resident is supposed to mean. According to their very wording, the provisions of Art 6
(2) and (3) of the proposal are not applicable, because they govern only the residency of companies, but not that of entities. The fact that Art 6 (3) and (4) do not only simply refer to companies but state that the criteria laid down in Art 6 (3) are relevant "for purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2" suggests that an analogous application of these rules is impossible.
Furthermore, an application of Art 82 of the proposal requires that the taxpayer "by itself, or together with its associated enterprises, holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 50% of the voting rights" or "owns more than 50% of the capital" or "is entitled to receive more than 50% of the profits of that entity". There must hence be a participation of more than half of the voting rights, of the capital, or of the profits of the enterprise. At least in respect of voting rights, an indirect participation is sufficient. Furthermore, the rule applies also if the taxpayer fulfills this requirement only "together with its associated enterprises". "category" is taken into account for the purpose of computing the 30% threshold only if more than 50% of the category of the entity's income comes from transactions with the taxpayer or its associated enterprises. Every category of income shall apparently be taken into account separately.
Consequently
Example: A company resident in a low-tax country derives 60% of its profits from trading goods of any kind with independent third parties, and 20% each from interest and royalties.
40% of interest and 80% of royalties come from transactions with the shareholder. In that case, Art 82 is not applicable, since only royalties are harmful income, but these represent only 20% of total profits. However, if 60% of interest and 60% of royalties come from transactions with the shareholder, Art 82 will be applicable to the entire profit, because interest and royalties are then considered harmful and together represent 40% and hence more than 30%.
It is difficult to see the meaning behind this regime. The differentiation by "categories of income" or "categories" seems to produce arbitrary results. Similarly, it is not understandable why income from immovable property (Art 82 (3) (e)) should exclusively be exempt if the Member State of the taxpayer would not have been entitled to tax the income under an agreement concluded with a third country. Admittedly, the state of residence can lose the right to tax according to the OECD-MC, yet there are numerous bilateral DTCs which also exempt certain categories of interest in the state of residence. 43 There is no reason why different rules should apply here.
The consequences of an application of Art 82 are governed in Art 83 of the proposal, which provides that income to be included in the tax base shall be calculated according to the rules of Articles 9 to 15. Thus, rather than directly relying upon the tax base of the company in the third country, the tax base is recalculated, obviously based on the assumption that companies in third countries are resident in the EU. As a result, dividends or proceeds from a disposal of shares must be exempt pursuant to Art 11 of the proposal. The same is true for proceeds from a disposal of shares derived from the third country or another third country. Similarly, the income of a permanent establishment in a third country shall not be included in the tax base.
Art 11 itself does not distinguish whether or not the income is then taxed in that other third 43 Lang, Überlegungen zur österreichischen DBA-Politik, SWI 2012, 108 (111 et seq).
country. However, if the company is actually resident in the EU, Art 73 orders an exception from the exemptions provided under Art 11 (c), (d) and (e). According to its spirit, the exception laid down in Art 73, as such triggering a switch-over, should also be applicable in these situations. Yet it is not applicable according to its wording, because Art 83 (1) simply refers to Articles 9 to 15 of the proposal. That provision differs from the last sentence of Art 84 (1), which is applicable to transparent entities and provides that "the income shall be computed under the rules of this Directive", and it also differs from Art 74, which provides that the "revenues, expenses and other deductible items" of a permanent establishment in a third country "shall be determined according to the rules of the system provided for by this Directive".
Let me give you an example: A company subject to the CCCTB regime holds a 100% participation in a company resident in the low-tax country A. That company exclusively derives income from dividends which come from a participation in a low-tax country B. The company resident in B generates its profits from interest earned from loans granted to other group companies and is taxed at a rate of only 5% on those profits. Provided that Art 82 is applicable to the company resident in A, the income shall be calculated pursuant to Articles 9 to 15. The dividends from B would have to be exempt, which is why the CFC rule would eventually not apply. However, if Art 73 is applied in addition, the dividends must be included in the tax base and the CFC rule becomes effective.
The legal consequence of Art 83 of the proposal does not consist in a full "look-through approach". Pursuant to the second sentence of Art 83, losses of the foreign entity shall not be included in the tax base, but shall be carried forward and taken into account when applying Art 82 in subsequent years.
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Art 83 of the proposal prevents economic double taxation if the foreign entity distributes profits in subsequent years or if its shares are disposed of in subsequent years. Accordingly, the income previously included in the tax base pursuant to Art 82 is deducted again when the entity's profits are distributed or its shares disposed of. Art 83 (4) and (5) apparently presupposes that the otherwise relevant exemption of Art 11 (c) and (d) does not apply, because the application of Art 82 also triggers a switch-over pursuant to Art 73.
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IV. Transparent entities
Qualification of entities in third countries
The proposal contains also rules on transparent entities. 45 Where an entity is treated as transparent, a taxpayer holding an interest in the entity shall include its share in the income of the entity in its tax base. For the purpose of this calculation, the income shall be computed under the rules of this Directive. Transactions between a taxpayer and the entity shall be disregarded in proportion to the taxpayer's share of the entity. There are no regulations on the criteria to be relied upon for the computation of the taxpayer's share, such as those for controlled foreign companies. proposal could suggest such an understanding: Art 84 (3) would lose its meaning otherwise, as the general obligation to credit third country taxes already arises from Art 76 anyway. In the context of Art 84, the reference to Art 76 could suggest an indirect credit.
If the entity which is treated as transparent has a permanent establishment in the third country which fulfills the requirements laid down in Art 5, the entity's assumed transparency will lead to the permanent establishment being regarded proportionally as that of the taxpayer.
Consequently, the exemption of Art 11 (e) of the proposal applies and the income must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the tax base. If a third country entity is qualified as non-transparent, received profit distributions are exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c) and proceeds from a disposal of shares are exempt pursuant to Art 11 (d). Against that backdrop, it makes little difference whether a third country entity is treated as transparent, as the profits generated there and from that entity are obviously exempt anyway. However, if the third country entity is treated as transparent, it is exempt within the EU if it has a permanent establishment in the third country and if the profits can be attributed to it. In other words, if the third country entity is a corporation established under the laws of that country, which derives only interest and does not have its own permanent establishment, Art 85 of the proposal will subject to tax the interest received by the third country entity at the level of its shareholders in the EU. If indirect credit is considered unacceptable, this situation may even give rise to double taxation, because the same interest is attributable to the company located in the third country according to the law of that third country and, according to the proposal, to the shareholder in the EU.
In a mirroring case, however, even double non-taxation may occur: If the third country entity without a permanent establishment is treated as transparent in its state of establishment, interest it receives might not be taxed at all in that state. However, if it is not regarded as transparent pursuant to Art 85 of the proposal, income will not be attributed to the EUresident shareholder for the purpose of the Directive and any subsequent transfer of the third country entity's profits is then qualified as received profit distribution and is exempt pursuant to Art 11 (c) of the proposal. A tax liability could at best be inferred from Art 73 of the proposal if the profits are not taxed in the third country, for example because there is no permanent establishment. Then again, the application of Art 73 is opposed by the fact that the tax exemption is the result of its treatment as transparent rather than the consequence of a low rate of taxation. If that consequence arises from the tax system as a whole, there will be no "special regime" which could also trigger the application of Art 73.
A "dividend" paid by the third-country entity to the EU shareholder cannot be taxed. In case of transparent entities, it is more difficult to derive that tax exemption from Art 11 (c) of the proposal, because a look-through approach is applied to the "distributing" entity pursuant to
Art 84 (f). Consequently, the "distributing" entity cannot be identified easily. However, to assume a tax liability would be inconsistent with the purpose of the rule, as it lies in the very nature of transparency to immediately tax the company's profits without having to wait for their transfer to the shareholder. As a consequence, the lack of taxability of profits transferred to the shareholder can obviously be derived from the system laid down in Art 84 (f).
EU permanent establishments of third-country entities and transparency
In any event, the criteria which may be relied upon pursuant to Art 85 of the proposal for third country entities differ from those which are relevant pursuant to Art 2 (2) for the companies established according to the law of a third country. Pursuant to Art 85, the only criterion is the qualification according to the national law of the shareholder's state of residence in the EU.
Pursuant to Art 2 (2), it is decisive whether the company "has a similar form to one of the forms listed in Annex I". In reliance on the opinion discussed above, the different forms must be compared and the major features of all forms listed in Annex I must be identified. Even if the focus is merely put on a similarity with those forms which are listed in Annex I for the relevant state of the permanent establishment, the criteria need not be the same as those which apply according to the national laws of that state for the purpose of classifying foreign companies for purposes of corporate tax. Difficult interpretation problems and even distortions may arise from the differences between Art 85 and Art 2 (2) of the proposal. located in its territory, the entity of the third country qualifies as "company" according to the proposal.
In this event, the subsidiary's income shall be included proportionally into the tax base of the company which is resident in A pursuant to Art 85. The same is true for the profits attributable to the third country's permanent establishment in the EU. After all, the permanent establishment is no independent enterprise and can hence not be qualified pursuant to Art 84.
The permanent establishment's income cannot be exempt, since Art 11 (e) applies only to permanent establishments in a third country. The third country entity itself, however, is regarded as taxpayer in Member State B. Pursuant to Art 6 (2) of the proposal, it may opt for the application of the rules of the Directive for its EU permanent establishment. In that case, a
group cannot be formed with the company resident in A, because the share amounts to only and not more than 50%. As a consequence, the profits attributable to the permanent establishment located in state B must be recognized both at the level of the company resident in A and also at the level of the third country entity itself and are hence taxable in state B
where the permanent establishment is located. In this case, the application of the Directive leads to double taxation in the EU. The tax imposed in B can at best be credited in A if the reference in Art 84 (3) to Art 76 of the proposal is interpreted as to allow also an indirect credit.
Controlled foreign companies and transparency
Another question is the relationship between the rules in Art 84 (f) on transparent entities and Art 83 (4) of the proposal indirectly confirms that tax liability, stipulating that the amounts of income previously included in the tax base shall be deducted from the tax base.
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In this case, there is evidence to support the supposition that the CFC rule is not relevant, because it can be found in Chapter XIV of the proposal which, by its title, deals with "Antiabuse rules". If a general rule such as that on transparent entities regulates the attribution of income to the EU shareholder, there is no necessity to bring the anti-abuse rules into play.
V. Double taxation conventions (DTCs)
Priority of DTCs with third countries
The relationship between the Directive and the DTCs is complex. 47 There is a tight network of The Court held that the goal of preventing double taxation did not allow any other interpretation of the treaty rules.
It is unproductive for a solution to rely on the objective of the DTCs alone. 58 Although DTCs shall prevent double taxation, they shall do so only within their scope of application. 59 As a result of CFC rules, the two states will attribute the income to different persons, and the DTCs usually do not focus on ensuring protection against such economic double taxation. 60 The
Commentary does not offer a solution either: It is the treaty rule which is decisive, and its content must be interpreted in reliance on the Commentary. Based on an appropriate view, however, that applies only if the version of the Commentary which addresses the issue had already been available when the relevant DTC was concluded. 61 In case of those DTCs which are modelled after the OECD Model, Art 7 is one possible distributive rule. Pursuant to Art 7 OECD MC, the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting
State shall be taxable only in that State, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein and the profits are attributable to that permanent establishment. The state of residence does not have a right to tax if those profits must be exempt under the method of taxation rules. In the case of such a foreign controlled company the profits which are attributable to the EU company, the DTC can achieve that effect only if the attribution of profits, for purposes of treaty law, also leads to its qualification as a permanent establishment of the EU company. It is, however, highly doubtful whether that attribution, decided on national level, could also impact Art 7 OECD MC. 62 Art 7 OECD-MC is however applicable only if Art 10 OECD-MC does not apply, as the latter has priority pursuant to the rules of subsidiarity of treaty law. If the participation in such an entity represents a share in a company, I believe that the requirements for an application of Art 10 OECD-MC are fulfilled, as the share is causal for the tax liability pursuant to Art 82 (f). 63 This applies not only to the distribution of profits, but also to the profit itself. The application of Art 10 OECD-MC is occasionally doubtful, for example because there is no payment. 64 In my opinion, however, the term "pay" must not be construed so restrictively and covers any event which triggers a tax liability within the scope of Art 10 OECD-MC. 65 Whoever considers Art 10 OECD-MC applicable will conclude that the EU Member State is not prevented from applying Art 82 (f).
DTCs and transparency
The same considerations could apply in respect of participations in those companies which are qualified as taxpayers in the third country, while being treated as transparent in the EU Member State in which the shareholder is resident. Foreign controlled companies are only one special case of those scenarios. These cases must hence be treated equally for purposes of treaty law. The fact that the title of Chapter XIV which concerns foreign controlled companies is "Anti-abuse rules" does not change anything. Consequently, there is strong evidence that those profits can be recognized in the Member State pursuant to Art 84 (f), either pursuant to Art 10 OECD MC or pursuant to Art 7 OECD-MC, if the third country entity's permanent establishment is not regarded as permanent establishment of the shareholder.
Distributions undoubtedly fall under Art 10 OECD-MC. The fact that they are exempt in the Member State under Art 11 (c) of the proposal should not prevent the third country from applying the DTC and the limitation of withholding tax as provided therein. Treaty benefits may be claimed despite the fact that proceeds from shares are exempt. However, the last sentence of Art 76 (1) of the proposal prevents a credit of the remaining withholding tax which is lawfully imposed.
VI. Conclusion and legal outlook
The proposal represents an impressive legal achievement. Its authors were able to propose provisions, which largely make the principles of the proposal a reality in a convincing manner. Still, especially those of the proposal's rules which are relevant for third country scenarios give rise to difficult questions of interpretation. Given the complexity of the matter, these or other instances of doubts would presumably arise even if the authors had chosen another method of regulating it.
Besides detailed suggestions, the following legal improvements could be made to the and makes its application more difficult. The Directive's provisions should be autonomous whenever possible without having to refer to the national law.
-The transparency rules are one example that the Directive regulates the same question -namely how to classify foreign entities for the purpose of the Directive -in a different manner. Many a problem of interpretation could be avoided if those questions were resolved according to uniform criteria.
